"supra-constitutional principles" that were intended to control the drafting of a new constitution, a task clearly in the jurisdiction of the new parliament according to the March 30 constitutional declaration, a document discussed below. These proposed principles included the provision that only SCAF would have access to the details of the military's budget and that all legislation concerning the military would have to be approved by SCAF; the parliament would only control the total sum allocated to the military. 4 The principles also gave SCAF the power to veto any provision of the new constitution that "contradicts the basic tenets of Egyptian state and society and the general rights and freedoms confirmed in successive Egyptian constitutions." 5 This document of supra-constitutional principles, along with a series of subsequent statements by SCAF, also indicated SCAF's attempt to control the selection of the constitution's drafters, in contradiction to the constitutional declaration.
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While these events marked key moments in SCAF's attempts to control the political process, SCAF had laid the groundwork for such efforts much earlier in the post-revolutionary period. The crucial turning point that showed that SCAF was a self-interested participant, willing to ignore the democratic choices of the Egyptian people if necessary to advance its own interests, came in the form of the constitutional declaration issued by SCAF on March 30, following the constitutional referendum of March 19. At that time, SCAF's actions drew little attention by foreign observers and even slight response within Egypt, in part due to the fact that it required a careful reading of the lengthy constitutional declaration in order to see exactly what SCAF had accomplished. While at that time SCAF surely had not formulated a full plan for the subsequent 4 Yezid Sayigh, "The Specter of 'Protected Democracy' in Egypt," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec. 15, 2011. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid; David Kirkpatrick, "Egypt's Military Retracts Plan to Extend Influence Over Constitution," The New York Times, December 9, 2011. transitional period, it was clearly already anticipating that it would want to exercise far more control, and for a far greater time, than it had envisioned prior to the constitutional referendum.
This essay examines the constitutional referendum and then the constitutional declaration with the goal of answering several questions. First, what was the constitutional referendum and what were SCAF's goals in drafting it and submitting it to the public for a vote? Second, why did SCAF subsequently determine that the referendum was not adequate and how did it seek to modify and supplement the referendum to produce the declaration? Third, how did SCAF embed in the declaration the basis for its own later assertion of greater power over the political and constitutional process? While the declaration was praised for replacing the 1971 constitution, a goal of the referendum's opponents, 7 and for providing more clarity about the transitional process, the declaration was also the first clear expression by SCAF of its long-term ambitions, even as it was not until later in 2011 that the significance of that expression became vividly clear.
The Constitutional Referendum
Soon after assuming control of the country, SCAF suspended the constitution and then announced that it had formed a committee of eight men to quickly prepare a slate of amendments. These amendments were intended to modify or remove only the most objectionable provisions so that the constitution could remain in force throughout the transition period to democratic civilian rule. The committee was headed by retired judge Tariq al-Bishri, who was known for his criticism of the former regime and for his dramatic changes in ideology, from the left towards a belief in a greater role for Islam in the state. SCAF also made the surprising appointment of Sobhi Saleh to the committee, a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. No other opposition parties or even leaders of the Tahrir movement were included, nor were any women.
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Within a short period of time, the committee had completed its task, and the amendments were presented to the public for discussion not long before the scheduled referendum on March
19
. 9 The substance of the amendments was largely noncontroversial, and the supporters and opponents were concerned with the consequences of adopting or rejecting the amendments more than with the actual content. Finally, Article 189, on the constitutional amendment process, was altered and new provisions were added dealing with the drafting of a new constitution. The article preserved the original method of amending the constitution, whereby either the President or the People's Assembly may propose amendments, which then must be approved by a parliamentary majority and in a popular referendum. Article 189 added a process for the creation of a new constitution that gave the People's Assembly and Consultative Assembly the power to jointly elect a drafting commission composed of 100 members. These two bodies were given six months from their first session to elect this drafting commission, and the drafting commission would have six months to complete the preparation of the constitution. The President would then hold a national referendum on the constitution within 15 days of the constitution's completion.
In the days before the referendum, lines of support and opposition became clear.
14 Opponents insisted that the revolution ousted both Mubarak and the constitution that was so intimately linked to his authoritarian rule, and that SCAF had no authority to revive it in order to call for its amendment. Recognizing the constitution even for the purpose of amending it would be an impermissible return to a rejected past. Opponents also complained that the amendment drafting was secretive and opaque; it looked too much like a Mubarak-style process to be acceptable after the revolution. The SCAF-selected drafters basically made the same alterations as Mubarak himself had offered to make in his final plea to stay in power, as if he were still in charge. Opponents of the referendum also objected to the single-slate style, also used in the Mubarak-era, whereby voters had to accept or reject the whole package.
Referendum opponents, who included liberals, intellectuals, and the youth who led and partook in the revolution, were also concerned that the process that would follow a positive vote would privilege pre-existing political groups and organizations, and the former-NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. While SCAF did not state when parliamentary and presidential elections would be held, it implied that they would be as soon as possible after the constitution was amended. The first parliamentary elections in particular would be essential because those elected officials would be the ones to oversee the process of writing a new constitution. Opponents of the referendum thought that under an expedited timetable they would simply not be able to compete with groups-and namely the Muslim Brotherhood-who were already organized and ready to enter into a vigorous election season. Their preference was to focus on the new constitution first, with a broad and representative committee taking the time to carefully draft the document that would then guide Egypt through the first fair elections, both parliamentary and presidential. Referendum opponents were willing to tolerate a longer military rule in order to prepare the constitution first.
Supporters of the referendum, which included the Muslim Brotherhood, said that it dealt with the worst provisions of the constitution, making it a document that should be acceptable to everyone for the near term, until a new president and parliament could oversee the drafting of a new document. The process that the referendum envisioned would result in the military handing over power to a civilian government sooner rather than later, which was essential for national stability, they argued. This appeal to stability was successful among a large section of society that may have supported the revolution but did not want the economic and political uncertainty that ensued. As for giving them a substantial edge in the elections, members of the Muslim Brotherhood said that they suffered for their opposition to Mubarak during his reign and so any advantage they may have post-revolution was fairly earned. Further, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to alleviate fears that it would achieve large electoral successes (while implicitly expressing its belief that it could do so) by stating that it would only run in a limited number of parliamentary races and would not nominate a presidential candidate.
The turnout on referendum day was unprecedented: long lines were typical at some polling stations, and many Egyptians interviewed while they were waiting said that it was the first time they had voted in an election or referendum because in the Mubarak era the outcome was always pre-determined. According to the head of the judicial committee that supervised the process, 41% of Egypt's 45 million registered voters cast a ballot. Nationwide, 77% voted in favor of the amendments, with the highest concentration of votes cast in opposition located in Cairo and Alexandria. 15 While there were some reports of electoral irregularities in the process, including vigorous campaigning both inside and just outside the stations, in general SCAF was credited with conducting a free and fair election.
The referendum served important functions for SCAF. First, in terms of the actual process on the day of the referendum, SCAF proved itself to be a good faith actor, clearly
showing that it could and would hold elections in a manner markedly different from those of the Mubarak era. Those who had opposed the referendum quickly followed the announcement of the results with statements recognizing the legitimacy of the outcome. Second, if SCAF's goals prior to the referendum were to transfer power to a civilian government as soon as possible, then the adoption of the amendments served its interests. A negative vote would have delayed the process substantially, and might even have resulted in a lengthy constitutional process first, followed by elections, which would have kept SCAF in control for a much longer time. 16 Third, the referendum validated the role and authority of SCAF itself. Just by participating, Egyptians tacitly recognized SCAF's power and authority as the interim government. Even those who rejected the amendments validated SCAF's role not only by voting but also by accepting that if their view prevailed, it would have meant a longer tenure for SCAF.
While supporters and opponents of the referendum were engaged in last minute campaigning, SCAF made a surprising announcement: the results of the referendum, positive or negative, would be followed by a "constitutional declaration." Prior to that announcement, it had been expected that if the referendum passed, the constitution would be considered amended and returned to force. In such a case, the declaration was anticipated to be a straightforward statement of the timetable for subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections. If the referendum did not pass, SCAF would have to devise a new plan.
After the announcement of the referendum's passage, however, Egyptians waited for more than a week for the declaration. During that time, press reports suggested that the declaration would include not only the amended provisions adopted in the referendum but also other provisions from the constitution that would be needed in the interim period, along with some guidance on the political process ahead. This new bundle would act as a temporary constitution until a new constitution could be drafted and approved. Although SCAF clearly 16 The New York Times reported that "the ruling military council had sought the rapid timetable to ensure its own speedy exit from running the country. articles, it effectively superseded the 1971 constitution. Unlike the process of drafting the amendments that were proposed in the referendum, which was done by a committee headed by Tariq al-Bishri, the drafters of this constitutional declaration were not identified. The declaration consists of articles from the 1971 constitution as amended in the referendum; articles from the 1971 constitution as amended in the referendum with additional changes made by SCAF; articles from the 1971 constitution that were not part of the referendum, some of which were included verbatim and some of which were amended by SCAF; and several new articles that specifically recognize and give powers to SCAF.
The result was procedurally and substantively confusing. According to the 1971 constitution, amendments to it required approval in a constitutional referendum; SCAF recognized and abided by this process when it held the March 19 referendum. In the days following it, however, SCAF on its own initiative put together a document that better suited its changing goals and essentially abrogated the constitution whose procedures it had asserted were necessary to follow in the referendum process. In doing so, SCAF transitioned from presenting itself as a caretaker of the revolution and the constitution to taking control of the process and creating its own constitution, one that, unlike the 1971 text or its final set of amendments as adopted in the referendum, made SCAF a constitutional actor with broad powers. In the process, SCAF left most of the 1971 constitution on the drafting room floor, such that many issues are simply not provided for in the declaration, with the result that SCAF has significant power and discretion.
The results of the referendum were largely included verbatim in the declaration. Article One article as amended by the referendum was further modified by SCAF for inclusion in the declaration. SCAF apparently decided after the referendum that amended Article 189 was not sufficiently conducive to the constitutional process and altered its language to make clear that the constitutional drafting process could begin-and even conclude-before the presidential elections were held. While not explicit, the referendum anticipated that both presidential and parliamentary elections would be held before constitutional drafting commenced. The declaration, in article 60, added new language to make clear that it is SCAF, and not the president, that convenes a joint session of parliament, within six months of the elections for both houses, in order for parliament to elect the 100-member drafting commission. In doing so, SCAF confirmed that the process could begin in the absence of a president.
Further, the referendum had amended Article 189 to state that the president should present the new constitution within fifteen days of its completion to the voters in a referendum.
Thus, a president should be in place at least by the time the drafting was completed. In Article 60 of the declaration, SCAF explicitly altered that language to provide merely that the constitution will be presented to the voters in a referendum within 15 days of its completion, without specifying who should do the presenting. The constitution takes effect from the day on which it is so approved. Thus, the president does not have to be elected by this time; rather, SCAF could be the entity that arranges for the referendum on the new constitution.
SCAF's revisions to Article 189 disregarded the results of the referendum, suggesting that SCAF was not committed to a democratic or even coherent constitutional process. In the Mubarak era, constitutional amendments were forced upon the populace through referendums that were clearly fraudulent; here, SCAF altered the results of a referendum that was considered free and fair. The alteration was not merely technical. The declaration does not pressure SCAF to return the country to civilian control since the presidential election process can be delayed indefinitely without affecting the constitutional process. In a separate new article, the declaration provides that SCAF's role, as detailed in the declaration, continues until elections for both houses of parliament and for president have been completed and they have all assumed their duties. 19 The delay of presidential elections translates into prolonged rule of SCAF.
This revision to Article 189 drew surprisingly little criticism at the time. 20 By the fall of 2011, the implications became clear: SCAF may remain in power throughout the constitutional drafting process, which not only prolongs SCAF's rule but, more importantly, gives SCAF an opportunity to exert influence on the drafters. Even if SCAF does not succeed in actually appointing members to the drafting committee, it will still have the opportunity to affect the drafting and even achieve its own substantive goals in the new constitution. And indeed, Egyptian protestors in late 2011 and early 2012, realizing SCAF's intentions to delay presidential elections, began pressuring SCAF to hold them as soon as possible. 21 As of late January 2012, SCAF's plan does seem to be to hold presidential elections only after the constitution has been approved and to attempt to satisfy its critics by rushing the entire process rather than by putting the presidential elections before the constitution.
19 Art. 61. 20 An exception is Nathan Brown and Kristen Stilt, "A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise," supra note 17. 21 Nathan Brown has called the presidential election process as expressed in the constitutional declaration one of the "landmines" in Egypt's constitutional roadmap. Nathan Brown, "Landmines in Egypt's Constitutional Roadmap," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec. 7, 2011.
The articles in the declaration dealing with fundamental rights and freedoms are taken from the 1971 constitution verbatim, guaranteeing, for example, equal protection of law and freedom of expression, although it is not clear how these protections will be enforced in practice.
In the Mubarak era, legislation eroded the rights provided in the constitution, undermining substantially their plain meaning, and much of this legislation appears to remain in force. 22 The SCC had been willing to strike down in the past some legislation that was backed by the regime. 23 Presumably, the SCC will continue to play this role under the constitutional declaration, but appeals to the SCC take time to make their way through the court process. As it was tasked to do under Article 28 of the referendum, the SCC has already considered the "constitutionality" of the presidential election law and identified several provisions that contradict the declaration. By doing so, the SCC has implicitly recognized the declaration as the current constitution. 24 Whether the SCC will consider other claims based on the declaration is not yet known.
The logic of taking other articles from the constitution and inserting them into the declaration is not obvious. SCAF maintained the requirement that half of all parliamentary deputies be either "workers" or "peasants"; this Nasser-era idea was determined by Sadat to be an essential component of the 1971 constitution although it was criticized as unnecessary by some in the course of drafting that constitution. By 2011, it seemed clearly outdated. SCAF's reasons for including it are unclear, but it certainly assisted parties (chiefly the Muslim 22 Article 62 of the declaration states that all laws and regulations remain in force, but they may be amended or abrogated according to the procedures provided for in the declaration. Article 56 of the declaration, which is one of the new articles created by SCAF, gives SCAF authority over legislation. The People's Assembly also has some legislative power, creating a tension between it and SCAF in this regard; Nathan Brown calls this tension one of the landmines of the constitutional process. Yet, the process by which the declaration was produced, and the substantive alterations and additions, undercut at least some of these benefits and set the scene for the struggles that unfolded in late 2011. Insofar as voters were told that passage of the referendum would result in the continued force of the 1971 constitution, as amended, SCAF's subsequent behavior shows that Egypt is not currently on the other side of the "threshold beyond which no one can intervene to reverse outcomes of the formal democratic process," as Adam Przeworski has argued is a crucial moment in the transition to democratic rule. 29 The unilateral issuance of the declaration is troubling because it followed a popular referendum the outcome of which was disregarded.
Once the referendum was held, SCAF lost its ability to hold another one on the declaration without provoking voters to ask whether SCAF really intended to be bound by the results the second time.
If SCAF had the power to abrogate the 1971 constitution and write a constitutional declaration for the interim period, why did it start down the path of amending the constitution?
One explanation is simply SCAF's lack of experience with governance, forcing it to learn day by day. The amendments may have seemed like a good idea to SCAF in late February but a month later the shortcomings of that approach became evident, and SCAF may even have become convinced by the arguments of those who opposed the referendum that the 1971 constitution could not and should not be revived. Another important explanation for the change, as 29 Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy 62 (1988). articulated in this essay, was SCAF's realization that it was not as eager to turn the country over to civilian rule as it had thought from the outset of the referendum process.
The changes SCAF made to the constitutional drafting process, as well as provisioning for itself in the declaration, show when and how it decided that it wanted to play a significant role in shaping post-revolutionary Egypt. In order to preserve its own power and future autonomy, SCAF was willing to extend its rule to ensure that result. As of early 2012, it is certainly anticipated that tense negotiations among SCAF, the elected parliamentarians, the constitutional drafters, and the populace over significant issues such as the military's significant economic privileges will dominate political life in the course of the year, and that SCAF will not hand over power to a civilian government without gaining assurances that many aspects of the military will remain outside of civilian oversight. SCAF, initially considered the guardian of the revolution, became determined to prioritize its own interests of maintaining the same status and privileges for the military enjoyed during the Mubarak regime over the interests of the public that initially welcomed it as guardian.
